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Canzoneri and Diba (2004) show that the Taylor principle is not a panacea for 
equilibrium determinacy in a model where bonds and money provide liquidity 
services to households. We consider a cashless New Keynesian model with two 
types of government bonds. One bond provides transaction services, whereas the 
other is used only as a store of value. We show that the Taylor principle is still 
sacrosanct, and that the results of Leeper (1991) are confirmed. 
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Taylorin periaatetta, jonka mukaan keskuspankin on muutettava ohjauskorkoaan 
talouden inflaatiovauhdin muutoksia suuremmalla määrällä, pidetään yleisesti mo-
dernin rahapolitiikan normatiivisen analyysin yhtenä kulmakivenä. Taylorin pe-
riaatteen mallisidonnaisuutta on tutkittu viime aikoina suhteellisen aktiivisesti ja 
joissakin tutkimuksissa on osoitettu, että periaatetta ei voida pitää patenttiratkaisu-
na hintatason määrittyneisyydelle taloudessa, jossa kotitaloudet nauttivat rahan ja 
valtion joukkovelkakirjojen hallussapitoon liittyvistä likviditeettipalveluista. 
Tämän tutkimuksen moderni teoreettinen makromalli kuvaa taloutta, joka on luo-
punut käteisen käytöstä ja jonka valtionvelan markkinoilla kaupataan kahdenlaisia 
valtion joukkovelkakirjoja. Näistä joukkovelkakirjoista yksi sopii ominaisuuk-
siensa vuoksi maksuvälineeksi hyödykemarkkinoiden kaupankäynnissä, kun taas 
toinen soveltuu paremmin rahoitusmarkkinoille varallisuuden hallussapitoväli-
neeksi. Työssä osoitetaan, että Taylorin periaate ei tällaisessa taloudessa rikkoon-
nu. Talouden hintataso on tällöin siis määrittynyt edellyttäen, että finanssi-
politiikka ei ole ristiriidassa Taylor periaatteen mukaisen aggressiivisen korko-
politiikan kanssa. 
 
Avainsanat: rahapolitiikka, finanssipolitiikka, valtion joukkovelkakirjat, määritty-
neisyys 
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The Taylor principle has become one of the pillars of modern normative analysis
of monetary policy. In a nutshell, it prescribes that the central bank should adjust
the nominal rate of interest more than one-for-one as a response to changes in
the in°ation rate. In the standard New Keynesian model, the Taylor principle
alone pins down the equilibrium in°ation rate. The validity of this prescription
has been challenged in the recent debate on the ¯scal determinants of in°ation.
The argument that the price level is determined by the degree of solvency of
the government suggests that the response of monetary policy to in°ation is an
insu±cient metric for nominal determinacy. Monetary and ¯scal policy should be
coordinated. In the ¯scal theory of price level determination proposed by Leeper
(1991), the Taylor principle should be coupled with a response of the tax rate to
changes in real debt of more than one-for-one to achieve a determinate in°ation
rate.
One of the assumptions of Leeper (1991) is that government bonds play no
direct macroeconomic role. Canzoneri and Diba (2004) and Canzoneri et al (2006)
study the interactions between monetary and ¯scal policy when bonds provide
transaction services for the purchase of consumption goods. This implies that
there is a direct channel for government bonds to a®ect the in°ation rate. Hence,
the Taylor principle need not hold any longer for determinate equilibria to exist.
The analysis of Canzoneri and Diba (2004) and Canzoneri et al (2006) assumes
that real money balances play a key role. Not only does money enter the utility
function of households. Money and bonds are imperfect substitutes. Their
aggre- gation generates a measure of liquidity that facilitates the purchase of
consumption goods.
The role of monetary aggregates in New Keynesian models is the subject of
a recent debate. For instance, Woodford (2007) argues that the omission of a
demand for money is not at odds with the neutrality of money. Beyond these
arguments, we should stress that money demand creates an additional bu®er that
a®ects the relation the interest rate, consumption and in°ation. This raises the
question of the role played by money demand in the results of Canzoneri and
Diba (2004).
In this paper, we follow Woodford (1998) and assume that the quantity of
money that facilitates transactions is negligible.1 On the other hand, we introduce
1This is also consistent with the presence of a `channel system' of control of interest rates
that allows an e±cient management of the aggregate quantity of money (see Woodford, 2002).
7two types of bonds. One of them, which we call short-term bond, provides
transaction services. The other one, labelled long-term bond, does not a®ect
the purchase of consumption goods. We show that the results of Leeper (1991)
hold also in our framework. Moreover, the Taylor principle is still sacrosant, as
it requires ¯scal policy to be passive in order to pin down the price level.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model economy,
with a focus on the portfolio allocation problem of households. In section 3, we
discuss the equilibrium characteristics with explicit reference to the existence
of a de°ationary/in°ationary equilibrium path. In section 4, we describe the
loglinearized version of the model. The calibration is presented in section 5. The
results on determinate equilibria are detailed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model with bond transaction costs
In this section we explore in a more detailed fashion the role of bonds as liquidity
providers in an economy without money. In what follows, we assume that there
are two categories of bonds. The ¯rst is a can be exchanged on the market at
low costs, and provides the transaction services that are assigned to money in a
standard monetary economy. The second type of bond is held in the households
portfolio as a store of value across periods.
2.1 Households
There is an in¯nite number of agents indexed on the real line between 0 and 1.














where Ct indicates the amount of consumption, and Lt the amount of labor
e®ort supplied by each single agent. In (1) ¯ indicates the discount factor, while
¾ denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity, the inverse of which is the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion.
We assume the existence of a large number of di®erentiated goods indexed over
the real line between 0 and 1. This allows each ¯rm to have a control of the price of
her ¯nal good to be sold, since output becomes demand determined. Following the
approach by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we assume that the consumption bundle
Cit demanded by each agent i 2 [0;1] is a CES type aggregate of all the j 2 [0;1]











where µ is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent varieties of goods
produced by each ¯rm j. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, the
elasticity µ is restricted to be bigger than one. Standard optimization problem for




















The aggregate price level Pt is beyond the control of each individual ¯rm.
When we aggregate Cit and ci
t (j) across all agents i; we obtain the aggregate
demand for ¯nal goods and for variety j given by Yt =
R 1
0 Citdi and Yjt =
R 1
0 ci
t (j)di, for all j 2 [0;1].
2.2 Portfolio choice








it¡1 + (1 + it¡1)Bit¡1
+ WitLit + Pt­
j
it ¡ PtCit (1 + Âg (Fit)) ¡ Tit (5)
The households allocates resources between two types of bonds, B¤
it and Bit.
Bonds B¤
it are standard in that they do not provide any type of transaction
service. This security pays an interest rate i¤
t¡1. Bonds Bit, can be used to
purchase consumption goods through the transaction technology f (Fit). The





9From (6) we observe that Fit plays the same role of the velocity of circulation of
money. The function g (Fit) is required to have the properties
g (Fit) = 0 for Fit · 0 (7)
g0 (Fit) > 0 and g00 (Fit) ¸ 0 (8)
Assumption (7) tells us that negative bond holdings do not provide any
transaction services. Assumption (8), instead, shows that the transaction cost
function is increasing and convex in Fit. The convexity of g (Fit) is needed to
make sure that the utility maximization program delivers a true maximum.
Summing up, the term Âg (Fit) introduces transaction costs in terms of
consumption spending, with a constant scale parameter Â. Implicit in our
formulation there is the assumption that the economy under analysis possesses
an almost perfect mechanism to shift funds from one checking account to another
by changing the portfolio composition of government bonds holdings.
Finally, from equation (5) we have that in addition to income derived from
investment in bonds (it¡1Bt¡1 and i¤
t¡1B¤
t¡1), each agent derives funds from
supplying labor in quantity Lit, paid at the wage rate Wit. An additional source
of income is the participation to the pro¯t of j-th ¯rm producing the ¯nal good
variety j, ­
j
it: A lump sum tax denoted by Tit is levied on the income of the
household.
2.3 Optimality conditions for households















it (1 ¡ Lit)
(1¡°)(1¡ 1




















¸itBit = 0; ¸it ¸ 0 (13)
¸itB¤
it = 0; ¸it ¸ 0 (14)
In (9){(14) ¸it indicates the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint (5).
Equation (9) de¯nes the intertemporal choice of consumption, where the e®ects
of ¯rst order due to the transaction technology appear a critical element in the
de¯nition of intertemporal trade-o®s. Equation (10) de¯nes the optimal labor
supply choice and equates the disutility from work e®ort to the real wage weighted
by the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (11) indicates the optimal
10allocation of bonds B¤
it¡1, while equation (12) represents the optimal allocation
of bonds Bit. From equation (12) we observe that the presence of transaction
costs generates a wedge between left and right hand side.
2.4 A disgression on the transaction cost function for bonds
In what follows, we assume that the functional form for the transaction cost






Function (15) ful¯lls all the requirements stated in (7) and (8) and allows a
tractable derivation of the equilibrium conditions. Therefore, using (15) into (9)









where bit = Bit=Pt: It is immediate to verify that short term bond demand (16)
is (i) increasing with respect to it and Cit, and (ii) decreasing with respect to
i¤
t. In fact, if the return on short-term bonds rises, they become more attractive
with respect to long-term bonds. If consumption increases, then the demand for
short term bonds increases, because of the need to ¯nance a wider number of
transactions. Finally, if the return on long-term bonds i¤
t increases, the demand
for Bit reduces. Equation (16) is similar to a traditional money demand function
with money instead of short-term bonds. It should be pointed out that equation
(16) is de¯ned only for a positive spread between the rates.
The imperfect substitutability existing between the two types of bonds is
already re°ected into the transaction role attached to the quantities of short-term
bonds. However, in order to obtain simple closed-form solutions, we assume that
the rate of returns on long-term bonds follows a close relationship with the rate
of return on short-term bonds. We assume that the relationship existing between
the rate of returns of the two types of bonds is
i¤
t = ³tit (17)
where ³t is a stochastic term representing the comovements existing between the
long rate i¤
t and the short term rate it. The term ³t can be represented according
to the stochastic process
log³t = (1 ¡ ½³)³ + ½³ log³t¡1 + "³t (18)
11where ³ is the steady state level of ³t and "³t is a random variable i.i.d. and
normally distributed as N(0;¾2
³), and the autoregressive coe±cient ½³ is lower
than one.
2.5 The production side
Staggered pricing arises from menu costs along the lines of Rotemberg (1982).












where ¼ is the steady state of the in°ation rate and Áp is the parameter of the
adjustment cost function AC
p
t that determines the level of price rigidity existing
in the model. Under (19) a ¯rm pays a cost in terms of output Yt each time the
price level of her ¯nal goods di®ers from steady state in°ation rate ¼.
The production function of each variety j is
Yt (j) = AtL®
t (j) (20)
According to (20) each ¯rm employs a given quantity of labor Lt (j) in the
production of j-variety. Note that all ¯rms producing j varieties are subject
to a technology shock At
logAt = (1 ¡ ½A)A + ½A logAt¡1 + "At (21)
Where ½A < 1 and "At is an i.i.d. random variable, normally distributed with
zero mean and variance ¾2
a:
Each individual ¯rm faces a downward demand curve of the same demand
(3), with Yt (j) in place of Cit and chooses the optimal quantity of labor input



















subject to the demand function (3), to the production function (20) and to the
price adjustment cost function (19). Note that in (22) ½t is a stochastic pricing
kernel for contingent claims employed by ¯rms to discount future pro¯t stream.



















































In (47){(24), Ãt (j) can be interpreted as the output demand elasticity augmented
by the cost of price adjustment weighted. At the steady state, if
Pt(j)
Pt¡1(j) = ¼ for








In steady state, the markup is µ
µ¡1, so that when µ ! 1; ¹ ! 1.
2.6 Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint can be written as
Bt + B¤






t¡1 + Gt ¡ Tt (26)
In (26) the primary de¯cit (surplus) Gt ¡ Tt plus interest rate proceedings paid
by the government to the owner of government debt (both short and long debt)
it¡1Bt¡1, i¤
t¡1B¤
t¡1, are ¯nanced by issuing new debt, namely Bt¡Bt¡1, B¤
t ¡B¤
t¡1.
The equilibrium condition for government bonds suggests that the demand















We assume the existence of a ¯scal policy rule that sets the level of taxes in
reaction to the outstanding level of real debt








We should remark that the demand for short term debt is a function of the
nominal interest rate, the current output and the demand conditions in the goods
market, as clari¯ed by equation (16). Therefore, the government's behavior is
constrained by the evolution of long term debt. The parameter Ã1 re°ects the
13solvency condition of the government, and measures the reaction of ¯scal policy
to the level of long term debt. A ¯scal policy that follows rule (30) is entirely
de¯ned according to the size of parameter Ã1. Thus, according to Leeper (1991),
¯scal policy is passive if
¯ ¯¯¡1 ¡ Ã1
¯ ¯ < 1; (31)
and active otherwise. This condition (31) imposes a constraint on Ã1 in order to
generate a non-explosive path for public debt.
Finally, public expenditure Gt is exogenous according to
logGt = (1 ¡ ½G)G + ½G logGt¡1 + "Gt (32)













The nominal short-term interest rate it reacts to in°ation ¼t and output gap xt
with intensities captured by the coe±cients Á¼ and Áx.
3 Aggregate equilibrium
An important aspect for a full characterization of the equilibrium is represented
by the role of intertemporal discount factor of both ¯rms and consumers. We
assume that each agent has access to a set of complete market for contingent
claims. The direct implication of this assumption is that the discount factor of







For the intuition behind condition (34) it is enough to imagine the presence of a
representative agent who can freely exchange shares of each ¯rm, without paying
any transaction cost.
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where the optimal choices are the same
across all agents. This way, we can assume that Xit (j) = Xt for all i and j.
14Therefore, by combining the First Order conditions on consumption and labor












From equation (35) it is not di±cult to show that labor supply function is
increasing with respect to real wage, but decreasing with respect to consumption.
After making use of the equation of the government budget constraint, we can


















From (36) we observe that the amount of income available for consumption
is obtained net of resources employed for making transactions and public
expenditure. An important feature considered in the present model derives from
the speci¯c functional form assumed for the transaction costs function (15). In


























Therefore, since ¸t is a monotone decreasing function of Ft, there are at least two
positive steady state satisfying (37). The ¯rst is such that ¸ = 0 with F = 1.
The second takes the form
(1 + i)¯
¼
= 1 ¡ ÂF3 (39)
There might be no solution to equation (39). This occurs if (1 + i)¯ > ¼. If
we assume that (1 + i)¯ < ¼, we immediately get that equation (37) becomes a
di®erence equation, with a converging solution.
3.1 A constraint on bond velocity
Here we brie°y sketch an argument in order to exclude that the `bond velocity'
term F grows arbitrarily without bound with positive probability. Let F be the
unique solution to (39). If we have an o®-equilibrium path value for Ft such that
15Ft > F or ¯ < ¼, then from equation (37) we ¯nd that
Et [¸t+1] < ©¸t (40)
for a given ©, such that 0 < © < 1. Therefore, given the information available
at time t condensed by the information set It, the probability that ¸t+1 is lower
than ¸t is positive, given equation (40), ie
P [¸t+1 < ©¸t j It] > 0 (41)
Applying (41) recursively, we get
P [¸t+s < ©s¸t j It] > 0 (42)
Equation (41) and the transaction technology function impose an upper bound
on F. This allows to exclude any path for ¸t that require F growing with
positive probability. To sum up, if Ft > F for all t, then ¸t must have a positive
probability of growing arbitrarily close to zero as t ! 1. However, this would
imply a non-zero probability of arbitrarily large values of Ft. Therefore, Ft > F
is impossible on an equilibrium path. By a similar argument, if ¯ > ¼, we have
a positive probability of getting an arbitrarily large large value of F, which is
inconsistent with an equilibrium positive level of short-term debt.
From the same argument, if Ft < F and ¯ > ¼ for some t, we have that
there is a non-zero probability that ¸t+s becomes arbitrarily large, so Ft assumes
values arbitrarily close to zero, as t ! 1. Again, this is inconsistent with the
equilibrium path, because it violates the transversality condition. Again, we must
conclude that the value for F that solves (39) is an equilibrium value.
4 Loglinearized model
The next step consists in reducing the model into a three equations system an
intertemporal version of the IS equation, the aggregate supply equation (AS,
henceforth) and the government budget constraint. In order to derive the reduced
form system, we take a log-linear approximation around the steady state. In
what follows, each variable Xt is approximated around the steady state by using




Sc (1 + ÂF2)
¡
g




Sc (1 + ÂF2)
e ³t +
2ScÂF2bi
Sc (1 + ÂF2)
e it (43)
where the coe±cients b³ and bi are reported in Appendix A.
We then log-linearize the ¯rst-order conditions (9) and (10), eliminate e Ct
from both equation, by making use of (43). Next, we can eliminate e Lt from the
log-linearized version of the production function to obtain
e ¸t = ´ye Yt ¡ ´g e Gt + ´a e At + ´³e ³t + ´ie it (44)
with the coe±cients ´y;´g;´a;´³;´i.
From equation (11), we obtain the intertemporal IS equation
e Yt+1 ¡ ¸g e Gt+1 + ¸a e At+1 + ¸³e ³t+1 + ¸ie it+1 ¡ ¸¼e ¼t+1 =
e Yt ¡ ¸g e Gt + ¸a e At + °³e ³t + °ie it (45)
where the coe±cients are de¯ned as ¸g = ´g=´y, ¸a = ´a=´y, ¸³ = ´³=´y,
¸i = ´i=´y, °³ = (´³ ¡ ®i)´¡1
y , ¸¼ = ´¡1
y . Equation (45) is the intertemporal
IS equation discussed by McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). The new feature of equation (45) is the presence of the nominal
interest rate dated at time t + 1, e it+1, together with the interest rate dated at
time t, e it. The presence of e it+1 is due to the characteristics of the transaction
technologies F and B considered in the model.
The derivation of the aggregate supply equation starts from the
log-linearization of the elasticity Ãt, which takes the form
e Ãt = Ápe ¼t ¡ ¯Ápe ¼t+1 (46)
To simplify the algebra, we assume that the steady state of the in°ation rate has
been set equal to 1. From the ¯rst order condition with respect to L we have
that
f Wt = e Yt ¡ e Lt + (µ ¡ 1)
¡1 Ápe ¼t ¡ (µ ¡ 1)
¡1 ¯Ápe ¼t+1 (47)
Moreover, from the production function e Lt = ®¡1
³
e Yt ¡ e At
´
. To get an useful
expression of the AS equation, we can substitute out into the log-linearized version
of (10), the equation (47) for f Wt, equation (44) for e ¸t, equation (43) for e Ct, and
17e Lt. After rearrangement, we ¯nd
¯Ete ¼t+1 = e ¼t ¡ ¹ye Yt + ¹g e Gt + ¹³e ³t + ¹A e At + ¹ie it (48)
where the coe±cients ¹y; ¹g; ¹A; ¹³; ¹i are reported in Appendix A.
The model is expressed as a function of the output gap Xt de¯ned (in log-linear
terms) as e Xt = e Yt ¡ e Y
p
t , where e Y
p
t is the level of potential output (or full













Therefore, the aggregate supply equation can be written as
¯Ete ¼t+1 = e ¼t ¡ ¹y e Xt + ¹ie it (50)
By the same argument, we can rewrite the IS equation by using the de¯nition of
output gap (49), to get
e Xt+1 + ¸ie it+1 ¡ ¸¼e ¼t+1 = e Xt + °ie it + Rn
t (51)
where Rn










e At ¡ e At+1
´




t de¯ned in (52) indicates the natural rate of interest from the value
of the real interest rate consistent with a full employment equilibrium and a zero
in°ation rate.
We should stress that, di®erently what is proposed in the literature, the
aggregate supply curve (50) includes the nominal interest rate e it. The presence
of e it is due to the relationship existing between the level of real debt bt and the
nominal interest rate that originates from the direct dependence of the Lagrange
multiplier from nominal rate it.
Since the present model considers the issue of price level determination on
the basis of ¯scal solvency, a key equation of the above system is the government
budget constraint. In order to make the system entirely de¯ned by four variables
(in°ation rate, output gap, interest rate and short-term real debt), we can now
derive the semi-reduced form of the government budget constraint
°y e Xt +e b¤




t¡1 + µie it¡1 + µy e Xt¡1 + R2t (53)




















e ³t¡1 ¡ °³e ³t (54)
with all the coe±cients reported in Appendix A.
Summing up, the system is made of three equations that are function of the
nominal interest rate. After substituting out the reaction function of the central
bank, we get a model in three equations and three unknowns ¼t; Xt and bt.2
5 Calibration
In order to characterize the bounds for the monetary policy parameters, we
provide a set of values for the `core' parameters of the model, obtained according
to a calibration procedure on the basis of quarterly observations drawn for the US
economy over the sample 1959:1{2007:4. The calibrated values for the non-policy
parameters are reported in Table 1.
The level of the discount factor delivers a value for the real interest rate (in
gross terms) equal to 1.003 per quarter, which is consistent with the empirical
observations on US economy. The nominal interest rate has been set equal to 1.6
per cent per quarter, as recovered from sample observations. In order to simplify
algebra, the long run in°ation rate (in gross terms) has been set equal to 1.
The share of consumption in GDP at the steady state is assumed to be 0.57.
The value of Â has been set to match a level of transaction costs equal to 2 per
cent per year. The elasticity of substitution ° between consumption and leisure
is set to 0.76, in order to match the long-run ratio of market to non-market
activities L
1¡L = 0:2243 suggested by Christiano (1991).
The elasticity of substitution between di®erent goods variety µ has been set
to be equal to 10, implying a mark up equal to 1.1, as it is customary in the
current literature. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (the inverse of risk
aversion coe±cient) ¾ has been set to be 0.1. The estimated values tend is close
to 0.08. The parameter ® indicates the share of consumption in the production
process as proposed by the large part of the real business cycle literature. Finally
the parameter Á0 in the ¯scal policy reaction function has been set to match the
steady state ratio of debt to GDP equal to 0.44. The parameter Ã1 describing
the maginal the reaction of taxes to real debt is set to a benchmark value of
2In what follows, we drop the tilde sign from each variable. Hence all the variables are
expressed in log-linear deviations from the steady state.
190.05, which lies within the range established by inequality (31). We calibrate the
parameter A to match the post-World War II level of output of the US economy.
The parameters of the stochastic side of the model are reported in Table 2.
The values for ½A and ¾2
A are from Kim (2000), while the values for ½G and
¾2
G are from Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2002). For what concerns the value of
the parameters of the equation (18). The steady state value for ³t has been
obtained from the average spread existing between a one-month Treasury Bill
and the 10-year government bonds for the US economy. From the dataset, we
have ³t = 0:24 on average over the all sample. We estimate equation (18) and
obtain ½³ and ¾2
³ = :00196.3
6 Determinacy of a REE
In this section we analyze the determinacy conditions for two speci¯cations of
the central bank's reaction function, namely the cases of pure in°ation targeting
and standard Taylor rule.
6.1 Targeting current in°ation
Here we consider the loglinearized interest rate rule
it = Á¼¼t (55)
According to (55), monetary authority targets only the current in°ation rate. A
rule like (55) is a very simple representation of the pure in°ation target regime,
and it represents a good approximation of the European Central Bank operating
procedures. After plugging rule (55) in the system (50){(53) and rearranging,
we get a three-equation system in ¼t; Xt, bt that can be represented in matrix
framework as follows4
AZt+1 = BZt (56)












3Equation (18) has been estimated by instrumental variables, with four lags of ³t as
instruments.
4Note that from equation (51) and (53) we left out the term R
n
t and R2t since they do not















1 + ¹iÁ¼ ¡¹x 0
°iÁ¼ 1 0




with a1 ´ °iÁ¼ + °¼, b2 ´ °iÁx + °y, b3 ´ µiÁx + µy: By inverting matrix A and
multiplying matrix B by A¡1, the system can be cast in the form






¯¡1 (1 + ¹iÁ¼) ¡¯¹x 0
°21 °22 0




where the terms °21, °22;°31, °32 in (61) are de¯ned as
°21 = ¯¡1 (1 + ¹iÁ¼)(¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼) + °iÁ¼
°22 = 1 ¡ ¯¡1 (¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)
°31 = [°y (¸iÁ¼ ¡ ¸¼) ¡ °i](1 + ¹iÁ¼) + b3 ¡ a1°iÁ¼
From (61) we immediately observe that the structure of the system is
block-triangular. Therefore, to study determinacy we can restrict our attention
to the 2 £ 2 submatrix ¢
¢ =
"




To get determinacy for the full system we require that two eigenvalues of
the system be outside the unit circle and one inside, since public debt is
a predetermined variable. This allows a richer con¯guration of determinacy
conditions rather than in cases without an explicit role of the government budget
constraint.
The conditions for determinacy are
Proposition 1 Let Á¼ > 0. Under contemporaneous pure in°ation targeting
rule, necessary and su±cient conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to
be determinate are that (a) either
Á¼ > Á¼1 and ¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1 (63)
21(b) or




Proof 1 See Appendix C. ¥
According to Leeper's (1991) terminology, condition (63) identi¯es a
combination of active monetary and passive ¯scal policy, while condition (64)
identi¯es a combination of passive monetary and active ¯scal. In the Leeper's
sense, an active monetary policy is de¯ned when monetary authority sets nominal
interest rate (or money supply) in order to keep under control the in°ation rate.
A passive monetary policy is when, instead, the interest rate (or money supply)
are left free to adjust. In the recent monetary policy literature, condition (64) is
obtained from a combination of active ¯scal policy and passive monetary policy.
If Á¼ > Á¼1 and Ã1 < ¯¡1 ¡ 1, Ã1 > ¯¡1 + 1, we have three roots inside the unit
circle. In this case, we have three converging roots and a continuum of solution.
In this case the price level is converging, but indeterminate.
6.2 Taylor rule
After log-linearizing the Taylor rule around the steady state, we obtain the
reaction function
it = Á¼¼t + ÁxXt (65)
Rule (65) is the standard Taylor rule proposed by Taylor (1993, 1999). According
to (65), nominal interest rate reacts contemporaneously with respect to current
in°ation and output gap. After inserting (65) into (50) and (51) and rearranging
















¯¡1 (1 + ¹iÁ¼) ¯ (¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) 0
®21 ®22 0






(¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)(1 + ¹iÁ¼)






(¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)(¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) + ¯ (1 + °iÁ¼)
¯ (1 + ¸iÁx)
(69)
b31 =
(°y + °iÁx)(¸iÁ¼ ¡ ¸¼)









®31 = b31 (1 + ¹iÁ¼) + b32°iÁ¼ + µiÁ¼ (72)
®32 = b31 (¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) + b32 (1 + °iÁ¼) + µy + µiÁx: (73)
Proposition 2 Given Á¼ > 0, Áx > 0. For a model with contemporaneous
in°ation and output targeting interest rules, necessary and su±cient conditions
for a REE to be determinate are that
(i) either
Á
¼ < Á¼ < Á¼ and ¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1 (74)
(ii) or
Á¼ < Á
¼ and Ã1 < ¯¡1 ¡ 1; Ã1 > ¯¡1 + 1 (75)
where
Á¼ =




¹x (1 + ¸¼) ¡ 2(1 + ¯) ¡ Áx (¸i + ¸¼¹i + °i (1 + ¯))
2¹i + ¸i¹x
Proof 2 See Appendix D. ¥
Even in this case we can con¯rm the same results discussed in the previous
case with a pure in°ation targeting rule. From condition (74) we have that a
combination of active-monetary with passive -¯scal delivers a fully determinate
equilibrium. Since matrix ¡ is once again lower triangular to guarantee a
determinate REE we need to have two roots outside the unit circle. Because
of the format of matrix ¡, the requirement of active monetary policy can be
violated, but the equilibrium is still determinate if ¯scal policy is properly set to
keep the price level determinate.
The nature of the bounds determined by (74) and (75) is more complex
than in the pure in°ation targeting case. This is because the upper and lower
limits for the in°ation targeting parameter Á¼ are now a function of the output
gap targeting parameter Áx. According to the benchmark parameter values
highlighted in Table 1, we get that the relationship existing between Á¼ and Áx is
23increasing, as represented in Figure 1. This ¯gure has been obtained by varying
Áx 2 [0;2]. In order to keep the equilibrium determinate, under a standard
Taylor rule, the in°ation targeting parameter must increase as Áx raises. Thus,
determinacy is reached only for combination of parameters lying on the line or on
above the line that separates the two region where we get either determinacy or
indeterminacy. The intuition behind this result is related to the logic underlying
the Taylor principle. The in°ation targeting parameter should be set to be bigger
than one, and the relative magnitude between Á¼ and Áx must be kept constant
as Áx raises. Of course, all these considerations hold if a monetary policy rule is
associated with a ¯scal policy rule that sets the primary surplus as a function of
real debt under the conditions established by (74). When, instead the conditions
are given by (75), the regions with determinacy/indeterminacy is reversed, with
respect to what has been represented in Figure 1. In this last case, monetary
policy need not be active provided that ¯scal policy is set according to (75).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we discuss the determinacy of the price level in a cashless
environment. We present a model with two types of government bonds, a
short-term bond that is used for the purchase of consumption goods, and a
long-term bond that is used as a store of value. If ¯scal policy is designed
according to the prescriptions of ¯scal theory of the price level of Leeper (1991),
determinacy is achieved by following the Taylor principle. In order to pin down
the price level, ¯scal policy should be passive in the sense of Leeper (1991).
These ¯ndings stand in stark contrast with those of Canzoneri and Diba (2004)
and Canzoneri et al (2006), who use a model with liquidity services from money
and bonds to suggest that the Taylor principle is not a panacea for determinacy.
A number of additional questions of interest are raised in our paper. Our re-
sults suggest that the introduction of a sophisticated demand for money a®ects
the determinacy properties of simple rules for monetary policy, rather than the
macroe- conomic role per se played by government bonds. It this sense it would be
important to understand whether di®erent modelling assumptions about money
matter for the determinacy properties. Finally, the introduction of distortionary
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 Appendix A Coe±cients of the reduced-form model
b³ =
³i
3ÂF3 (1 + ³i)
(76)
bi =
i(1 ¡ ³) + ³i2
3ÂF3 (1 + ³i)
2 (77)
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b[Ã2 ¡ (1 + i)g]
b¤Sc (1 + ÂF2)
27Appendix B Schur-Cohn criterion
The characteristic equation of a 2£2 matrix A is x2 ¡tr(A)x+det(A) = 0. It is
well known that the condition for two roots of the characteristic equation to lie
outside the unit circle is (see LaSalle, 1986)
jdet(A)j > 1; (78)
jtr(A)j < 1 + det(A): (79)
In particular, condition (79) can be split up in the two inequalities
1 + det(A) + tr(A) > 0 (80)
1 + det(A) ¡ tr(A) > 0 (81)
Appendic C Proof of proposition 2
















From condition (78) of the Schur-Cohn criterion, it is certainly true that det(¢) >





On the other hand, condition (80) directly implies
Á¼ >
¹x¸¼ ¡ 2(1 + ¯)
[2¹i + ¹x (°i + ¸i)]
(83)
while (81)
Á¼ (1 + °i ¡ ¸i) > 0 (84)
which is always satis¯ed since we set Á¼ > 0. By using the benchmark
parameter values considered in the model, it is immediate to verify that the
bound established by (83) is bigger than that speci¯ed by (82), under a wide
range of the core parameter values. Therefore, condition (83) is both necessary
and su±cient to ensure determinacy. For the system condensed in matrix ¡ we
require that the third root be inside the unit circle. This is true if condition (31)
28is respected, which is equivalent to require that
¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1 (85)
When both conditions (83) and (85) are satis¯ed, then all the three roots of the
system are inside the unit circle, and the equilibrium is unique. ¥
Appendix D Proof of proposition 3
Once again, given the triangular structure of matrix we can concentrate on the
eigenvalues of the submatrix ¡2£2
11 and that of ¡1£1
22 , in (66){(67).
The trace and the determinant of submatrix ¡2£2
11 are given, respectively, by
tr(¡11) =
(1 + ¹iÁ¼)(1 + ¸iÁx) + (¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)(¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) + ¯ (1 + °iÁx)
¯ (1 + ¸iÁx)
det(¡11) =
¹iÁ¼ + 1 + °iÁx ¡ ¹x
¯ (1 + ¸iÁx)
The condition det(¢) > 1 implies
Á¼ >
¹x ¡ (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ (°i ¡ ¯¸i)Áx
¹i
(86)
On the other hand, from condition (80) we get
Á¼ >
¹x (1 + ¸¼) ¡ 2(1 + ¯) ¡ Áx (¸i + ¸¼¹i + °i (1 + ¯))
2¹i + ¸i¹x
(87)
Finally, from (81) we ¯nd the constraint
Á¼ <
1 ¡ ¯ + (¸¼ ¡ 1)¹x + Áx (°i ¡ ¸i ¡ ¸¼¹i ¡ ¯°i)
¸i¹i
(88)
According to benchmark parameter values in the calibration section, we
immediately get that the only constraints that bind are (87) and (88). In fact,
the bound is determined by (86) is equal to 1.6233, while (87) is equal to 1.74.
Therefore, if (87) is satis¯ed, so is (86). Finally, the bound in (88) is equal to
153.9. Given the standard values for Á¼ this is always satis¯ed5.
Conditions (87){(88) imply that two eigenvalues of matrix ¡ are outside the
unit circle. This is enough to establish the determinacy of the REE induced by
rule (65). Thus, the third root given by the determinant of ¡1£1
22 should lie inside
the unit circle. This is equivalent to require that condition (31) be veri¯ed, or
that ¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1; that generates condition (74).
5Note that for the simulation it has been assumed a value for Áx equal to 0.5, as the
benchmark values proposed by Taylor (1999).
29If one of the constraints (87){(88) is not satis¯ed, then the submatrix ¡11
has one root inside and one outside the unit circle. To restore determinacy
we need another root outside the unit circle. This can be obtained by setting
¯ ¯¯¡1 ¡ Ã1
¯ ¯ > 1, or Ã1 < ¯¡1 ¡ 1; Ã1 > ¯¡1 + 1. ¥
30Table 1: Non-Policy Parameters
¯ Â ° µ ¾ Ã0 Ã1 ®
0.997 0.22 0.76 10 0.1 8.31 0.05 0.77
31Table 2: Calibration of shocks
Parameter ½A ½³ ½G





Value 0.0003 0.00196 0.000126
32Figure 1: Determinacy regions with Taylor-type rule
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